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IV

I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Order from which this interlocutory appeal is taken was entered on June 1,
2006. (R. 1180-1159). Plaintiffs filed their Petition for Permission to Appeal
Interlocutory Order with the Supreme Court on June 16, 2006. The Court granted the
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal on July 27, 2006. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court
by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) because the appeal is one over which the Court of
Appeals does not have original jurisdiction.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Appellees are Dissatisfied with Appellants5 Statement of the Issues.
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and because Appellees are
dissatisfied with the statement of issues provided in Appellants' Brief, Appellee hereafter
sets forth the Appellants' statement of issues and the reasons for Appellee's
dissatisfaction with the same.
A.

Appellants' Statement of the Issues and Standard of Review.

1.

Where parties own real property as tenants in common and enter into a clear

and unambiguous written agreement to sell the property and to distribute the proceeds
from the sale in a specific amount to each co-tenant, and following the agreement, sell the
property and divide the proceeds consistent with their agreement, may the court
subsequently order that the share of the proceeds of one co-tenant be divided again, as if
that share of the proceeds were still owned in common?
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of the contract and ensuing
1

legal determinations are questions of law, reviewed for correctness. Kimball v. Campbell,
699P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985); Crowtherv. Carter, 767 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah App. 1989).
2.

Where the court finds that a written agreement between general and limited

partners of a limited partnership clearly and unambiguously expresses that all partners
agreed to be governed by the terms of the written agreement and that the agreement is a
valid amendment to the limited partnership, did the trial court err in ruling that the
agreement failed to modify the method of distribution of the partnership assets upon its
termination?
Standard of Review: The Trial court's interpretation of the contract and ensuing
legal determinations are questions of law, reviewed for correctness. Kimball v. Campbell,
699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985); Crowtherv. Carter, 161 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah App. 1989).
B.

Appellees' Dissatisfaction with Appellants' Statement of the Issues.

Issue No. 1: Appellants' statement of the first issue presented by this appeal
contains an inaccurate and erroneous statement of the factual circumstances presented at
the trial of this action. Appellants refer to a 'clear and unambiguous agreement' but
cannot cite to or produce any agreement which provides for sale of the 30 acre parcel and
distribution of proceeds in specific amounts. Appellants fail to include in their statement
the fact that the property in question is the 30 acre parcel which was originally acquired
by Masazo Shiba ("Masazo") and Tosh Shiba ("Tosh") as tenants in common, each with
an undivided 50% interest in such property, and which interest Tosh had held since prior
to the creation of the Trusts or the Limited Partnership. Also, it is not clear from the
2

statement that Appellants challenge the trial court's factual finding that Tosh Shiba did
not ever convey his 50% interest in Masazo's home and the surrounding property, or the
trial court's corresponding legal conclusions that Masazo had no right to dictate the
disposition of Tosh's interest in the 30 acre parcel through his Trust. (R. 1163,1JH17, 18)
Therefore, as to the money deposited into the Fidelity Account from the proceeds
of sale of the Masazo home and property, Tosh was never a tenant in common with Sok,
and the clear and unambiguous Family Agreement did not provide for conveyance by
Tosh of his personal interest in the Masazo home and property to the Partnership, or to
Sok.
Issue No. 2: The basis of Appellee's challenge to the Appellants' statement of
issue no. 2 lies both in the inaccuracy of the statement of factual circumstances presented
therein as well as in the inconsistency with the statement of issue no. 1 as to the absence
of ambiguity, and with the argument raised by Appellants' Brief in support of such
statement. The primary asset of the Shiba Family Farms Limited Partnership
("Partnership") was the family farm, a tract of approximately 300 acres. (R. 1177, ^[12).
The Partnership also owned valuable water rights. (R. 1175, ^fl8). On January 10, 1995,
the farm land owned by the Partnership was sold, along with personal farming and
irrigation equipment owned by Appellant Masakazu Shiba ("Sok") and Tosh. (Rl 172,
1J33). On July 6, 1995, the Medical Clinic property was purchased by the following
parties and in the following percentages of ownership:
Limited Partnership

69.48%
3

The Masazo Trust
SokShiba

3%
13.76%

ToshShiba

13.76%

(Rl 171, | 3 8). The Warranty Deed delivered in connection with the purchase of the
Medical Clinic established title in the Medical Clinic to the purchasing parties in the same
interests as they contributed to the purchase price. (Rl 171, |39).
The Limited Partnership Agreement ("LP Agreement") provided that on an annual
basis or at other times as determined by the general partners, the profits from the
Partnership could be distributed to the partners "in accordance with their respective
capital contributions" and in the event of dissolution of the Partnership, the general
partners were to wind up the affairs of the Partnership and "distribute undivided interests
in partnership property to the partners in kind in proportion to their capital accounts at the
time of distribution." (Exh. 8) (R. 1177,ffi[9,10).
Despite Appellants' attempt to characterize their appeal as an appeal of the trial
court's interpretation of the contract, the issue presented for appeal in issue no.2 is, in
actuality, a challenge to the trial court's underlying determination of facts. Therefore,
Appellants' statement of the standard of review as pertains to issue no. 2 is incorrect. In
light of the fact that Appellants ask this Court to examine factual issues and
determinations, the standard of review of such findings should proceed under the more
deferential "clearly erroneous" standard. Gallegos ex rel Rynes v. Dick Simon Trucking,
Inc. 110 P.3d 710 (Utah App. 2004).
Under this standard, a trial court's findings will not be set aside unless clearly
4

erroneous. "In order to establish that a particular finding of fact is clearly erroneous,
'[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence.' If the evidence is inadequately marshaled, this
court assumes that all findings are adequately supported by the evidence." Chen v.
Stewart. 2004 UT 82, ^19, 100 P.3d 1177, 1184). As to mixed questions of law and fact:
The application of a legal standard ... involves varying degrees of
discretion depending on the standard in question. If the application of the
standard is extremely fact sensitive, then the reviewing court should
generally give the trial court considerable discretion in determining
whether the facts of a particular case come within the established rule of
law. Even where the [appellants] purport to challenge only the legal
ruling,... if a determination of the correctness of a court's application of a
legal standard is extremely fact sensitive, the [appellants] also have a duty
to marshal the evidence." Id.
Appellants' statement of the standard for review is incorrect, as it incorrectly
characterizes the question on appeal as strictly a legal question when it is a review of the
trial court's findings of fact. As shown above, Appellees have completely failed to
marshal the evidence. Therefore, the Court should assume that, in the Appellants' failure
to marshal, all findings of fact (including mixed findings of fact and law) are adequately
supported by the evidence.
III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

This is an interlocutory appeal from an order issued following the first phase of a
bifurcated action for dissolution and accounting of a limited partnership, and for the
5

probate and distribution of the assets of a trust, which is a limited partner in the
partnership.
B.

Court Proceedings and Disposition.

Appellees hereby adopt the Appellants' Statement of the Case as to the "Course of
proceedings and disposition below". (See Appellants' Brief, p. 3).
C.

Material Facts.

Appellant Sok, and Appellees Tosh, Natsuye Shiba Nishijima ("Nats") and Seiji
Shiba ("Seiji") are siblings and the children of Masazo and Riye Shiba ("Riye"), both of
whom are deceased. (R. 1179, f 1). Beginning in the 1950s, Masazo, Tosh and Sok
began to acquire farm ground in the area of Lehi, Utah and began to farm the land that
was acquired. (R. 1179, %1).
On May 25, 1959, Masazo and Tosh acquired by warranty deed approximately 100
acres of ground from Robert Webb and Phyllis Webb. Under the Warranty Deed for the
100 acres, Masazo and Tosh each held an undivided 50% interest as tenants in common.
(Trial Exhibit 60; addendum Exhibit A). Included within such acreage was a parcel of
approximately thirty acres upon which Masazo and Tosh each built homes (the "30 acre
parcel"). (R. 1178, P ) . On December 31, 1985, Masazo acted as Trustor in executing
the Masazo Shiba Marital and Family Trust (the "Masazo Trust"). On the same date,
Riye Shiba acted as Trustor in executing the Riye Shiba Marital and Family Trust (the
"Riye Trust"). Tosh and Sok were named as the Trustees of both the Masazo Trust and
the Riye Trust. (Trial Exhibit 2; addendum Exhibit B) (R. 1178, f4).
6

On December 31, 1985, Masazo conveyed to the Masazo Trust, by Quit Claim
Deed, all his right, title and interest in and to certain property including the 30 acre parcel
with his home and the home of Tosh Shiba. (Trial Exhibit 62; addendum Exhibit C).
However, Tosh did not convey his interest in the 30 acre parcel to the Masazo Trust.
Tosh retained his interest in the 30 acre parcel, including the homes of Masazo and Tosh.
(R. 1178, ^5). The Masazo Trust provided, among other things, that upon the death of
Masazo, the interest of the Masazo Trust in the home Tosh built and resided in, together
with a lot comprising approximately 1.49 acres should be distributed to Tosh or his heirs.
(Exhibit 2,1f (6)(i)). (R. 1178, f6). The Masazo Trust also provided that upon the death
of Masazo, the interest of the Masazo Trust in Masazo 5s primary residence, together with
the lot on which it was built, was to be distributed to Sok or his heirs. (Trial Exhibit 2,
paragraph (6)(ii)),(R. 1178,f7).
On December 31, 1985, the Partnership was created by the execution and filing of
the Articles of Limited Partnership of Shiba Family Farms. Sok and Tosh Shiba were
named as general partners of the Partnership, and the following were named as limited
partners: Masazo, Riye, Jean Shiba ("Jean"), Shizue Shiba ("Shizue"), Seiji, Delia Shiba
("Delia"), Nats, and Ronald Nishijima ("Ron"). (Trial Exhibit 8; addendum Exhibit D)
(R. 1178-77,1|8).
Among other things, the LP Agreement provided that on an annual basis or at
other times as determined by the general partners, the profits from the Partnership could
be distributed to the partners "provided that all of the partners shall participate in any
7

such distribution pro rata in accordance with their respective capital contributions" (i.e.,
"in the ratio of [the partners'] share of the capitalization of the partnership)." (Exhibit 8,
§§ 8.1 and 8.2) (R. 1177, f9). The LP Agreement also provided that in the event of the
dissolution of the Partnership, the general partners (i.e., Sok and Tosh) were to wind up
the affairs of the Partnership and could "elect to distribute undivided interests in
partnership property to the partners in kind in proportion to their capital accounts at the
time of distribution." (Exhibit 8, § 14.2) (R. 1177410). The LP Agreement could be
amended only if the amendment was proposed in writing to the limited partners, and the
consent of more than 51% of the ownership of the Partnership was given in writing, and
in any event no amendment which reduced "the interest of any partner's capital, profits,
and depreciation or sharing ratio"could be binding without the specific consent of each
partner affected thereby. (Exhibit 8, § 15.8) (R. 1177,1fl 1).
On December 31, 1985, Masazo and Riye conveyed to the Partnership farm land
totaling approximately 300 acres. This was the principal asset of the Partnership.
Following the conveyance of the farm land to the Partnership, Sok and Tosh operated the
farm as general partners under an agreement to rent the farm land from the Partnership.
(R. 1177,1|12).
On or after December 31, 1985, the interests of Masazo and Riye Shiba in the
Partnership were transferred by them to their respective trusts (R. 1176,ffi[13,14).
On December 4, 1990, Masazo executed the First Amendment to the Masazo Trust
to provide that the interest in the Partnership owned by the Masazo Trust "shall be
8

distributed in such a way as to achieve a final percentage of ownership" of any interest
held by the Masazo Trust in real property (including the 30 acre parcel but excluding the
houses owned by Masazo and Tosh) among the children as follows:
Masakazu (Sok)
Seiji
Natsuye (Nats)

43 14 %
6 XA %
6 !/2 %

Toshiro (Tosh)

43 l/2 %

The First Amendment to the Masazo Trust further directed the Trustees of the Masazo
Trust to "make distribution out of the shares this trust owns in [the Partnership], or which
it acquires by operation of my Last Will and Testament, to the above-named persons to
achieve said final result through my estate and the estate of my spouse. (Trial Exhibit 3;
addendum Exhibit E) (R. 1176, \\6).
On December 27, 1990, Masazo executed the Second Amendment to the Masazo
Trust to provide a specific legal description for Masazo's primary residence that would be
distributed upon his death to Sok. The parcel described in the Second Amendment to the
Masazo Trust was comprised of 1.372 acres. (Trial Exhibit 4; addendum Exhibit F) (R.
1175-76,^117).
Riye died on November 3, 1986. Upon her death, the interest in the Partnership
held by the Riye Trust merged with the Masazo Trust. As of Riye's death, the Masazo
Trust held a position as a limited partner in the Partnership equal to the combined
interests initially held by Masazo and Riye in the Partnership, subject to any transfers of

9

interests to other partners that were made between December 31, 1985 and Riye's death.
(R. 1175,H19).
Prior to December 1994, Sok and Tosh became unable to effectively cooperate in
the operation of the farm. This inability to cooperate also caused difficulty in the
operation of the Partnership. (R. 1175, ^j20). These difficulties led to the commencement
of prior litigation involving the farm ground and the operation of the Partnership. As a
result of the litigation, it was determined that the farm land should be sold. But the
partners decided that because of the low basis in the farm land, a simple sale of the farm
land would have incurred significant capital gains taxes. Therefore, the partners agreed
that a Section 1031 "like kind" exchange of suitable property for the farm land which
would be substituted into the Partnership to replace the farm land and avoid immediate
capital gains taxes. (R. 1175, ^[21).
The partners sought advice and counsel from a lawyer (David Jeffs) and from a
CPA to guide them in a Section 1031 exchange. (R. 1175, ^[22).
On December 3, 1994, the family, including Masazo, met at Ron and Nat's house
for a family meeting regarding Masazo's Trust, the Limited Partnership, Masazo's estate
plan, and Section 1031 transactions. On the same date, all the individual members of the
Partnership signed a family "Agreement" (the "Family Agreement") (Trial Exhibit 13;
Appellants' Exhibit 1). On the same date, Masazo signed a document entitled "No
Change Pledge to the Masazo Shiba Marital and Family Trust Agreement" ("No Change
Pledge"). Each of the siblings and their spouses signed the No Pledge Agreement as
10

witnesses. (Trial Exhibit 14; Appellants' Exhibit 1) (R. 1174, !}23). The Family
Agreement incorporated and specifically indicated an intent to be bound by four
identified documents: (1) No Change Pledge (Trail Exhibit 14); (2) Exchanging
Properties from the Farm Sale ("Exchanging Properties document") (Trail Exhibit 15;
Appellants' Exhibit 1); (3) Pre-Allocation Plans A & B ("Pre-Allocation Plans") (part of
Trail Exhibit 15); and (4) Present Ownership Schedule (part of Trial Exhibit 15)
(collectively the "Family Agreement"). (R. 1174,^24).
As part of the Family Agreement, Masazo pledged that he would not make any
further changes to the Masazo Trust, so that all his heirs and the partners of the
Partnership could rely on the inheritance they anticipated receiving from Masazo at his
death. Masazo acknowledged that implementation of the plan of the Family Agreement
would require him to amend the Masazo Trust and he agreed to cooperate by amending
his trust to facilitate the exchanging of properties outlined in the Family Agreement.
(Exhibit 14) (R. 1174, ^[25). However, Masazo never amended the Masazo Trust in the
manner contemplated. (See Trial Exhibits 1 through 7; addendum Exhibits B, E, F - J).
Although the fourth paragraph of the No Change Pledge purports to give
beneficiaries of the trust the right to acquire replacement properties upon the sale of the
farm using their anticipated trust inheritances, the same paragraph also contains the
statement: "The pre-allocated amount and its earnings shall remain my [Masazo's]
property until such time of distribution from my estate." (Trial Exhibit 14) (R. 1173,
11f27-28).
11

The Family Agreement provided that the assets of the Partnership could be
allocated to various children who would each locate a Section 1031 property to replace
their designated share of the farm land owned by the Partnership. The intent of the
Family Agreement was that the farm land was to be sold and, with the proceeds of sale,
the replacement properties could be purchased. (R. 1173,^f29). Income or loss and
management expenses for those replacement properties would be attributed to the partner
who located and designated the replacement property. By replacing the Partnership
property with the replacement properties, the sale of the farm land could qualify as a "like
kind" exchange and avoid immediate liability for capital gains taxes from the sale with
the basis in the farm land being transferred to the replacement properties, and the
management of Partnership assets would be effectively divided among the partners. (R.
1173,f29).
The plan set forth in the Family Agreement was proposed by lawyer David Jeffs in
a letter dated October 7, 1994. (Trail Exhibit 11; addendum Exhibit K). However, as set
forth therein, Mr. Jeffs recognized and instructed that implementation of the plan would
require modification of the LP Agreement to allow specific allocation of assets, income
and expenses among the partners. (R. 1173, ^30). The LP Agreement was never
modified to accomplish the proposed implementation of the plan. (Exhibit 8).
Following the December 1994 meeting, the partners all began looking for
exchange properties. Nats and Ron located a building lot in Farmington, Utah (the
"Farmington Lot"); and Sok located a medical office building (the "Medical Clinic").
12

The other partners were unsuccessflil in finding suitable replacement properties, although
Tosh made numerous offers to purchase properties from various owners. (See e.g., Trial
Exhibits 73, 86, 90, 91, 92, 95, 100, 111; addendum Exhibits L - S). (R. 1172,1J31).
On January 10, 1995, the farm land was sold, along with some personal farming
and irrigation equipment owned by Sok and Tosh in their individual capacities. The
purchase price of the farm land was $1,952,868. The purchase price of the farming and
irrigation equipment was $253,382, for a total purchase price of $2,206,250. (Trial
Exhibit 76; addendum Exhibit T). The sale of the farm land triggered the need to
designate replacement properties within the time required by the IRS for like kind
exchanges. (R. 1172, f 33). At the time of the sale of the farm land, the Masazo Trust and
Tosh also sold their interest in the 30 acre parcel, including the two residential lots and
homes, to the purchaser of the farm land. (Trial Exhibits 69 and 70; addendum Exhibits
U and V) (R. 1172, p 4 ) . The proceeds of the sale of Masazo's home and lot were
deposited into an account held at Fidelity Investments, account no. Tl03225994 in the
name of the Masazo Trust (the "Fidelity Account"). The Fidelity Account was
established under the joint control of Tosh and Sok, as Trustees of the Masazo Trust.
(Trial Exhibit 81; addendum Exhibit W) (R. 1172-1171,135).
On January 30, 1995, the Farmington Lot was purchased by the Partnership for
$57,000. (Trial Exhibits 26 and 71; addendum Exhibits X and Y) (R. 1171, f36).
When replacement properties could not be found by all the partners, it was
proposed that Tosh, Sok and the Masazo Trust contribute funds to complete the purchase
13

of the Medical Clinic and when refinancing was subsequently acquired, the funds would
be released to be placed in other projects. On July 6, 1995, the Medical Clinic was
purchased for the total purchase price of $1,610,415. The following parties contributed to
the purchase of the Medical Clinic in the following amounts:
The Limited Partnership, as to 69.48%
The Masazo Trust, as to 3%
Sok Shiba, as to 13.76%
Tosh Shiba, as to 13.76%

$1,118,628.00
$48,300.00
$221,536.00
$221,536.00

(Trial Exhibit 36; addendum Exhibit Z) (R. 1171, Tf38).
On July 6, 1995, a Warranty Deed was delivered by the seller of the Medical
Clinic, as Grantor, conveying and warranting title in the Medical Clinic to the following:
Shiba Family Farms, as to an undivided 69.48% interest; and
Masakazu Shiba and Toshiro Shiba, Trustees, as to an undivided 3% interest; and
Masakazu Shiba, as to an undivided 13.76% interest, and
Toshiro Shiba, as to an undivided 13.76% interest.
(Trial Exhibit 72; addendum Exhibit AA) (R. 1171-1170,1J39). The foregoing
percentages of ownership in the Medical Clinic were calculated by Mr. Jeffs, as directed
and assisted by the general partners, Sok and Tosh. (R. 1170, f40).
On November 21, 1995, refinancing for the Medical Clinic was accomplished with
the closing of a loan from Berkshire Life Insurance Company in the amount of $900,000
(the "Berkshire Loan"), and the execution of a non-recourse note in that amount by the
Partnership, the Masazo Trust, Sok and Tosh as obligors. (Trial Exhibits 74, 40;
addendum Exhibits BB and CC) (R. 1170, ^41). The proceeds of the Berkshire Loan
were deposited into an account or accounts owned by the Partnership and managed under
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the direction of Tosh, as a general partner. The proceeds of the Berkshire Loan were
invested in identified stocks and financial instruments and accounts in the name of the
Partnership, where they remain. (R. 1170,^42). Following its purchase, the Medical
Clinic was managed by Sok, as a general partner. (R. 1169,1J46)
On March 14, 1996, acting on the request of Sok, attorney David Jeffs wrote to
both Sok and Tosh to transmit a draft Management Agreement in an attempt "to resolve
many of the issues which we have previously discussed about the management of the two
properties, the allocation of income and the ultimate distribution of the properties." (Trial
Exhibit 87; addendum Exhibit DD). The proposed Management Agreement was rejected
by Tosh and no Management Agreement was ever entered into. (R. 1169,1}47).
At all times following the purchase of the Medical Clinic, the tax returns of the
Partnership showed that the Partnership treated its interest in the Medical Clinic as an
asset of the Partnership in the same capital percentage as the farm land had been held
before the sale. (See e.g., Trial Exhibits 44, 80, 94, 97, 99; addendum Exhibits EE - II)
(R. 1169,1J48).
Upon the advice of accountants, for tax years 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999, Tosh
attempted to make reconciliations or re-accountings of partnership income according to
the pre-allocations contemplated in the Family Agreement. The reconciliations for tax
years 1996 and 1999 were not used, but for tax years 1997 and 1998 partners made
payments to one another which they identified as "gifts" in order to specifically attribute
expenses of operation, profit or loss from the allocated properties to the partners who had
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located those properties. The "gifts" were made with the full knowledge of all partners
that they were not truly gifts but were attempts to reallocate or adjust the profit and loss
of the Partnership based on the pre-allocation of exchange property. (Trial Exhibit 29;
addendum Exhibit JJ) (R. 1169, f49).
At some point in this process, Tosh was advised that these "backroom" recomputations and "gifts" were illegal in that they violated both the still unamended LP
Agreement and the law related to Section 1031 exchanges. As a result, he discontinued
the preparation of reconciliations, and no more "gifts" were exchanged by the partners
after tax year 1998. (R. 1168, ^50).
In October 1998, Masazo passed away, rendering the Masazo Trust incapable of
further amendment. (R. 1168, f51).
Since at least December 1997 through the present date, Tosh and Sok have been
unable to cooperate on partnership matters and business, including the preparation of tax
returns for the Partnership. (See e.g., correspondence between Tosh and Sok in Trial
Exhibits 96, 112, 113, 114, 115, 130, 132; addendum Exhibits KK - QQ) (R. 1168, f52).
On January 6, 2000, Tosh wrote a letter to attorney David Jeffs responding to Mr. Jeffs
letter of March 14, 1996 regarding the proposed Management Agreement. Tosh
proposed a revised Management Agreement. (Trial Exhibit 23; addendum Exhibit RR)
(R. 1168, f 53). On February 4, 2000, Mr. Jeffs wrote to Tosh advising that Sok had
rejected the Management Agreement proposed by Tosh, and enclosing a proposed
Liquidation, Exchange and Distribution Agreement ("Liquidation Agreement"). (Trial
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Exhibit 24; addendum Exhibit SS). Tosh rejected the proposed Liquidation Agreement.
(R. 1168,f54).
On September 1, 2000, the Partnership, as Grantor, conveyed the Farmington Lot
to Ron and Nats, by Warranty Deed. (Trial Exhibit 30; addendum Exhibit TT, R. 1168,
H55).
All property except for the lot conveyed to Ron and Nats, real and personal, and all
financial accounts, have been retained in the name and title of the Partnership. (R. 1167,

1156).
As general partner of the Partnership, Sok has managed the Medical Clinic.
During the course of such management, Sok has withdrawn for his personal use funds
from the rental income of the Medical Clinic for which accounting has not been made to
the Partnership. (Tr. 497). As general partner of the Partnership, Tosh has borrowed
funds from the investment accounts of the Partnership, for which he has executed
promissory notes and paid interest to the Partnership in accordance with the provisions set
forth in the LP Agreement. (R. 1167, |57).
Prior to the Trial of this action, no dissolution of the Partnership has occurred, and
there has been no winding up of Partnership affairs. Amendments to the Partnership are
specifically allowed under section 15.8 of the Partnership Agreement upon approval of
more than 51% ownership interest of the partners. All of the partners representing 100%
of the ownership interest executed the 1994 agreement. (R. 1167, ffi[59-60).
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The 1994 Family Agreement (Trial Exhibit 13) clearly and unambiguously
expresses that all the partners agreed to be governed by four documents including the No
Change Pledge; the Exchanging Properties document; the Pre-Allocation Plans; and, the
Present Ownership Schedule. (R. 1167, TJ61).
IV.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court correctly concluded that Tosh Shiba is entitled to a distribution of
50% of the funds held in the Fidelity Account representing his interest in the proceeds
from the sale of Masazo's home and acreage because Tosh never conveyed his interest to
the Trust or the Partnership and Masazo had no legal ability to transfer Tosh's interest to
his trust. Further, the trial court correctly concluded that the Family Agreement failed to
modify distribution of the Partnership assets upon dissolution of the Partnership and that
distribution of the assets must be effectuated as previously established in the LP
Agreement.
Further, as Appellants have failed to argue the issues as presented, have not
properly preserved or raised the issue of ambiguity, have improperly present extrinsic
evidence of intent and have failed to marshal the evidence, this Court should adopt the
trial court's findings and conclusions, affirming the same on appeal.
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V.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT TOSH DID NOT
RELINQUISH TITLE TO AN UNDIVIDED ONE HALF INTEREST IN
THE MASAZO HOME AND ACREAGE AND IS, THEREFORE,
ENTITLED TO A DISTRIBUTION OF 50% OF THE FUNDS HELD IN
THE FIDELITY ACCOUNT FROM THE SALE OF MASAZO'S HOME.
As noted above, from a reading of Appellants' issue no. 1, it is difficult to

understand the precise legal issue Appellants seek to have reviewed. However, a reading
of Appellants' argument makes clear that Appellants seek to overturn the trial court's
conclusion and order that the funds deposited in the Fidelity account belong to Tosh and
Sok in equal shares. Appellants contend that in the Family Agreement, specifically the
Present Ownership Schedule, Tosh and the Masazo Trust agreed to convey their jointly
held property (i.e., Masazo's home) and distribute all of the proceeds from the sale of the
home to Sok. (Appellants' Brief at 16-18).
Appellants' argument fails for several reasons. First, Appellants have completely
failed to demonstrate how the Present Ownership Schedule constitutes an agreement for
Tosh to convey to Sok all of his interest in the Masazo residence. The schedule makes no
such statement and, although signed, does not contain a sufficient declaration of
contractual intent or a sufficient description of property to support a legal conclusion that
Tosh has conveyed his titled interest in a specific property to Sok. "If the property to be
conveyed under a land sales contract is not described by the agreement with certainty,
specific performance of the agreement may not be required." Barnard v. Barnard, 700
P.2d 1113, 1114 (Utah 1985). To the contrary, the Present Ownership Schedule sets forth
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a number of items of real and personal property and what appears to be corresponding
shares attached to each. The only reference to property in the Present Ownership
Schedule which could be the Masazo home is the following: "Res. #1 Masazo Shiba Mar.
& Fam. Trust." However, that reference is imprecise, does not include any legal
description of property and fails to reference Tosh's undisputed title to an undivided 50%
interest. Consequently, the Masazo home and related real property is not described
specifically or sufficiently, the shares are internally inconsistent from a mathematical
analysis, the calculations predate and presuppose a sales transaction (i.e., specific
amounts) that never occurred, and the calculations are not referenced in any of the text of
the Family Agreement in such a way as to support a finding or legal conclusion that the
parties had reached an agreement to convey property in the manner argued by Appellants.
Indeed, and to the contrary, the No Change Pledge (Trial Exhibit 14, Appellants'
Exhibit 1) references the Present Ownership Schedule, but does so in language which
unmistakably refutes Appellants' contention. At page one of the No Change Pledge,
Masazo provides that while the Present Ownership Schedule may be used by his children
to calculate a "pre-allocated amount", he makes clear that the "pre-allocated amount and
its earnings shall remain my property until such time of distribution from my estate," thus
dispelling any argument that a pre-distribution occurred. (Emphasis added). He
concludes the No Change Pledge by stating: "I will cooperate by amending my trust to
facilitate exchanging of properties outlined in the document titled 'Exchanging Properties
From Farm Sale presented in family meeting on December 3, 1994.'" (Trial Exhibit 14,
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Appellants' Exhibit 1). From the foregoing, it is clear that Masazo was discussing only
his property, and as to his property, Masazo decided to retain all ownership of the same
until it was distributed from his estate. Further, although he made clear any exchange of
properties would require modification of his trust and that he would cooperate in
amending it, the trust was never modified accordingly. Therefore, as to Tosh Shiba's
property, the No Change Pledge had no force or effect. It was applicable only to
Masazo's property held in trust.
It appears that Masazo may have been operating under a mistaken assumption that
his trust owned 100% of his home, or that he had simply forgotten that Tosh was the titled
holder of 50% of the home but, either way, Masazo had no legal ability to convey
property owned by Tosh. The trial court correctly ruled on this point.
Second, nothing in the language of the Family Agreement, including the Present
Ownership Schedule, contains any statement of agreement by Tosh to convey the
property. Further, there is no statement from which the existence of consideration to
support a conveyance by Tosh can by determined or implied. "Consideration is an 'act or
promise, bargained for and given in exchange for a promise. . . . " Resource Management
Co. v. Weston Ranch 706 P.2d, 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). "Where consideration is
lacking, there can be no contract." General Ins. Co. OfAmerica, v. Carnicero Dynasty
Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976). In the absence or lack of consideration stated or
implied in any of the Family Agreement documents, there can be no contract to bind Tosh
to a conveyance of his interest in Masazo's home and acreage. What is clear in the trial
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record is that no deed or contract exists for the purchase and sale, or the conveyance by
gift, of Tosh's interest in Masazo's home. The trial court recognized the absence of such
an agreement by concluding that Tosh retained his interest.
Nevertheless, Appellants argue that the Present Ownership schedule modifies the
agreement of the parties regarding their individual interests in the 30 acre parcel.
Appellants concede that the trial court concluded the four documents comprising the
Family Agreement were agreed upon by the parties and are "valid amendments to both
the trust and the [LP Agreement]" but Appellants fail to also point out that the trial court
found that such documents "fail to explicitly modify distribution of the replacement
properties upon dissolution of the partnership or termination of the trust." (R. 1164,

Finally, as discussed below, Appellants fail to direct this Court to any
detemiinative provisions of either the Masazo Trust or the LP Agreement which provide
for distribution of Tosh's interest in the proceeds of the sale of the residences. In light of
the lack of any definitive language in the Family Agreement modifying the Masazo Trust
or the LP Agreement, and the absence of language in the Trust and LP Agreement to
provide for conveyance of Tosh's property, the Court properly held that while the Preallocation Plans, together with the Present Ownership Schedule were calculations to assist
in the selection of and allocation of replacement properties, they do not affect the ultimate
plan for distribution of Trust and Partnership properties. As to Tosh's interest in the
Masazo home, the Court reviewed the plain evidence and concluded that Tosh retained
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legal title to half the property until he sold his share to the purchaser of the Farm, and his
interest could not be disturbed or amended by the Family Agreement.
Pursuant to the Masazo Trust, Masazo directed that the Trust's Vi share in the 30
acre parcel was to be distributed under three separate provisions of the Trust. Under
Section 5d(6)(i), the interest of the Masazo Trust in 1.49 acres "more or less"ofthe 30
acre parcel where Tosh's home was located was to be distributed to Tosh. Since Tosh
already owned the other undivided Vi of the 1.49 acres and home, as a beneficiary of the
Trust, he became the 100% owner of the home and parcel on which it sits. (Masazo
Trust, Exhibit 2, p. 7). Under Section 5d(6)(ii), as amended, the Vi undivided interest of
the Masazo Trust in 1.372 acres of real property where Masazo and Riye's primary
residence was located was to be distributed to Sok. (Masazo Trust, Second Amendment,
Exhibit 4). At the distribution of the Trust, that would result in Sok owning an undivided
Vi interest in the Masazo home and 1.372 acres, and Tosh owning an undivided lA interest
in the home and 1.372 acres (due to the fact that Tosh's interest was never conveyed nor
relinquished). Under Section 5d(6)(iii), the remaining portion of the Masazo Trust's Vi
share of the 30 acre parcel was to be distributed in equal shares to Tosh and Sok.
(Masazo Trust, Exhibit 2, p. 8).
At the time the farm was sold in 1995, the 30 acre parcel was sold with it. (R.
1172, ^34). All of the proceeds of the sale of Masazo's home and the 1.372 acres that it
sits on were deposited into an account known as the Fidelity Account, which is still
owned by the Masazo Trust. (R. 1172-1171, p 5 ) . Appellants fail to point out that not
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only does Tosh, by virtue of the 1959 Warranty Deed (Exhibit 60), own a half interest in
proceeds of the sale of Masazo's residence, but the Masazo Trust also provides that Tosh
is to receive the Masazo Trust's share in Tosh's residence, therefore making Tosh owner
of 100%) of the proceeds resulting from the sale of his residence and 50% of the proceeds
resulting from the sale of Masazo's residence. Therefore, the trial court properly
concluded Tosh was entitled to 50% of the Fidelity Account. (R. 1163, ^ 14).
In this case the merger doctrine supports the trial court's determination. The Utah
Supreme Court has recognized that the merger doctrine serves the purpose of
"preserving] the integrity of the final document of conveyance and encouraging] the
diligence of the parties." Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 795 (Utah 1986). In accord with
this principle is the basic premise that
ordinarily, a final contract does represent the final meeting
of the minds, and in it are merged all the terms expressing
the final intentions of the parties and any augmentations. If
there are inconsistencies between the terms of the
preliminary and final contracts, those of the latter will
ordinarily govern.
Embassy Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Ut.Ct.App. 1993); Quoting
Mawhinney v. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 150, 232 P.2d 769, 774 (1951). "Furthermore, the
supreme court has recognized that a deed is tantamount to a final real estate contract...
" Id. at 1371; Quoting Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 346, 348 (Utah 1979).
Here, Tosh's 50% interest (as established by the Warranty Deed) in Masazo's
home never was conveyed into the Masazo Trust and therefore the parties couldn't have
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agreed to a certain distribution because the Trust never owned the property. There is no
document that ever conveys Tosh's interest into the Masazo Trust. As such, the court
cannot distribute property pursuant to the Masazo Trust that the Trust does not own.
The parties agreed that Masazo's home, in which Tosh owned a Vi interest as
tenant in common (Exhibit 60, R. 1178), was valued at $150,000.00 (R. 1084-1083).
Subsequently, the proceeds from the sale of the home were placed in the Fidelity Account
(R. 1172, 1171). On December 31, 1985, Masazo conveyed, by quit claim deed, his
interest in the property including the 30 acre parcel on which his home stood. (Exhibit
62, R. 1178). However, Tosh did not convey any of his interest in the 30 acre parcel or in
Masazo's home. (R. 1178).
Therefore, pursuant to Tosh's ownership under the 1959 Warranty Deed and the
determinative provisions of the Masazo Trust, Tosh is entitled to one half of the proceeds
deposited into the Fidelity Account and one half of any interest accrued thereon.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE FAMILY
AGREEMENT FAILED TO MODIFY DISTRIBUTION OF THE
PARTNERSHIP ASSETS UPON DISSOLUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP.
Notwithstanding Appellants' improper arguments regarding ambiguity of the

Family Agreement, there has never been an effective amendment regarding modification
of distribution percentages pursuant to the LP Agreement. (R. 1164,fflf14-15). The trial
court concluded that amendments to the LP Agreement were specifically allowed under
section 15.8 of the partnership agreement (Exhibit 8) upon approval of more than 51%
ownership interest of the partners. Specifically, section 15.8 states, in part, the following:
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Amendments. If the General Partners shall propose in writing to the
Limited Partners the adoption of an amendment to this agreement, and if,
within thirty (30) days of the giving of a notice containing such proposal,
more than fifty-one percent (51%) in ownership interest of the partners,
including the General Partners, shall have given their written consent
thereto, then each Limited Partners, shall, if requested, promptly execute or
cause to be executed one or more amendments to this agreement and
certificates of the partnership as may be required to reflect such
amendments under the laws of the jurisdictions in which the partnership
does business at such time.
Here, there has been no such amendment. The trial court determined in its
Memorandum Decision that by reading the documents of the Family Agreement in
conjunction with one another:
it is clear that all agreed that both the trust and the SF partnership
agreement would allow the selection and management of replacement
properties to be assigned to each of the partners to a degree equal to their
percentage of ownership but that ultimate ownership and, critical for this
discussion, distribution upon dissolution of the partnership would be as
previously established. The documents .. . fail to explicitly modify
distribution of the replacement properties upon dissolution of the
partnership or termination of the trust.
(R.1086-1085).
The trial court also found that the partners were aware of the LP Agreement and
sought advice from professionals regarding implementation of certain financial strategies.
(R. 1175, f22). As such, the partners were aware that if they intended to modify or alter
the ownership shares of the partners they would have to comply with the LP Agreement
to effectuate such an amendment. (R. 1173, p 0 ) . However, this did not happen. Rather,
the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that there was no amendment and that
the partners implemented the 1031 exchange for the purpose of selecting and managing
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replacement properties, assigned to each partner to a degree equal to their percentage of
ownership in the Partnership, for management and diversification purposes only, but that
ultimate ownership and distribution of the Partnership would be as set forth in the
unamended LP Agreement. ( R. 1165-64, ffiflO-16).
Further, a limited partnership is a creature of statute and courts do not have
authority to disregard the legal structure and manner in which a limited partnership may
be amended. The trial court recognized this legal principle when it stated: ". . . the Court
concludes that it does not have equitable power to vary or ignore the terms and provisions
of the LP Agreement to alter the ownership shares of the partners therein." (R. 1065,
f 11). In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court based its conclusion on Utah Code §
48-2a-804, and stated:
Utah Code § 48-2a-804 requires that upon winding up of a limited
partnership, the assets shall be distributed in accordance with the
partnership agreement after accounting for interim distributions and
withdrawals.
(R. 1065-1064). Notably, Appellants do not challenge the trial court's conclusion that it
does not have equitable power to vary or ignore the LP Agreement.
Therefore, as limited partnerships are created by statute, and as the LP Agreement
is specific as to how the partners are to effectuate an amendment of the same, the trial
court's ruling is correct that it does not have the authority to ignore or vary the terms of
the LP Agreement to alter ownership percentages of the partners and that the Family
Agreement does not modify the distribution method of the LP Agreement. As such, there
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has never been an effective amendment altering or modifying the distribution percentages
of the LP Agreement.
Moreover, and contrary to Appellants' argument that the parties intended the
Family Agreement to amend the LP Agreement, the documentary evidence is clear that
the parties intended that the Partnership retain ownership of all replacement properties
and that upon dissolution of the Partnership, distribution of the assets would be as
previously established in the LP Agreement. (R. 1069, 1064).
1.

Appellants Misconstrue the Trial Court's Findings Regarding Payment
of Interest for Purchase of the Medical Clinic.

Appellants have misconstrued a finding of fact of the trial court and have failed to
marshal the evidence and clarify such finding in the attempt to have this court believe that
the parties' intent was something other than what the evidence demonstrates. In the trial
court's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 43, the court
found: "Interest for the use of the money for those months was charged to and paid by
Masakazu." (R. 1170). However, there was never a finding that Sok used his personal
funds to pay this interest. There also has never been a finding by the trial court that the
Partnership did not make final payment on the accrued interest for the use of the
aforementioned monies. Despite the absence of such a finding, Appellants have
nevertheless asserted that the interest for the use of this money was paid by Sok
personally. (Appellants' Brief at 29). This simply is not the case and is not supported by
the record.
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The payment referenced by the trial court in finding no. 43 (R. 1170) was
$31,264.59. This amount was calculated in the document entitled "Distribution of Interim
Amounts Before Loan Funding Under Pre-Allocated Basis." (See Exhibit UU to
Appendix). On that document, payment of the stated sum is referenced as having been
made by check no. 311 on November 20, 1995. The corresponding check is drawn on the
account of Shiba Family Farms - the Partnership - at Zions Bank. (See Exhibit VV to
Appendix). This clearly demonstrates that while Sok wrote the check, it was paid from
Partnership funds, not Sok's personal funds.
Though marked for use as exhibits at trial, the foregoing documents were not
introduced by either party. However, Appellees believe under the circumstances of this
argument, where Appellant wrongly implies from the Court's finding that Sok paid the
interest the factual assertion that Sok actually paid the interest from his personal funds, it
is appropriate to provide copies of records showing that Sok paid the interest from
partnership funds. At a minimum, Appellees have demonstrated that it is not proper for
Sok to draw the inference from the trial court's findings that payment of such interest was
made from Sok's personal funds.
Therefore, as Appellants' argument is based, in part, on the theory that the parties
used personal funds to pay the other partners for use of the partnership funds, and as this
scenario is not a true representation, Appellants' argument must fail. The trial court
determined that the properties and assets of the Partnership remain the property of the
Partnership until such time of dissolution. (R. 1086-1085).
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Therefore, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed that the Family Agreements,
as a matter of law, failed to modify the LP Agreement with respect to the distribution of
the replacement properties upon dissolution of the Partnership.
C

APPELLANTS FAIL TO ARGUE THE ISSUES AS PRESENTED, HAVE
NOT PROPERLY RAISED OR PRESERVED THE ISSUE OF
AMBIGUITY, IMPROPERLY PRESENT EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF
INTENT AND FAIL TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
1.

As Appellants Have Failed to Properly Raise the Issue of Ambiguity,
They Should be Barred from Arguing Such on Appeal and any Citation
to Extrinsic Evidence of Intent is Inappropriate and Should not be
Considered.

A review of Appellants' Brief shows that regardless of how they characterize the
issues, this is not an appeal of alleged legal error by the trial court. Indeed, there is
almost no citation to legal authority in the brief, and no attempt to demonstrate that the
trial court erred in its application of law to the facts. Instead, Appellants argue that the
Family Agreement documents at issue in this case are ambiguous and unclear, and focus
their argument on an analysis of selective evidence to show that the court committed
"legal error" in concluding that the LP Agreement required distribution of the assets of
the Partnership in accordance with the capital ownership of each partner.
Although it is difficult to identify the Appellants' argument from their presentation
of the issues,1 a review of Appellants' Brief shows that the argument as to issue no. 2 is
almost exclusively focused on the argument that the trial court erred in not interpreting

1

For this reason, the Appellees have challenged the statement of issues and set forth the
reasons for their dissatisfaction with the statement of issues presented by Appellant. See infra
pp. 1-5.
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the Family Agreement to be ambiguous with respect to the distribution of the replacement
properties at dissolution of the Partnership, and in failing to apply the Family Agreement
to distribute the property of the Partnership according to certain "pre-allocations" of
property for management within the Partnership. In making this argument, Appellants
contend that the trial court should have considered extrinsic evidence of the parties'
intent. (Appellants' Brief at 18-22). However, Appellants have failed to raise and
preserve the issue of ambiguity before this Court. Appellants never raised at trial, in their
docketing statement, or in their statement of issues presented, the question of whether the
trial court erred in failing to find, as a matter of law, that the Family Agreement was
ambiguous thus requiring examination of extrinsic evidence in order to amend the LP
Agreement on the question of distribution.
Rather, the Appellants specifically argued to the trial court that the Family
Agreement was clear and unambiguous and constituted an amendment or modification of
the LP Agreement with respect to distribution of the replacement properties. (Tr. 76168). The Court agreed in part that the Family Agreement "unambiguously expresses that
all the partners agreed to be governed by [the] four documents [comprising the Family
Agreement]." (R. 1165, ^[8). But the trial court further concluded, as a matter of law, that
pursuant to the No Change Pledge (Exhibit 14), "Masazo intended to transfer only the
ability to select and manage the particular replacement assets to the selecting partners
consistent with his goal to provide tax protection and diversification of control and
management over Limited Partnership assets." (R. 1164, ^|12). The trial court also
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concluded that the No Change Pledge "was an effective amendment to the Trust but that
the intent of such amendment was not to remove the designated replacement properties,
including the Medical Clinic, from [Masazo's] overall estate but to temporarily delegate
selection and management of replacement assets upon the sale of the farm land, and that
such properties would remain in his estate until his death when they would be distributed
in accordance with the terms of the Masazo Trust." (R. 1164, ^[13).
In summary of the foregoing conclusions, the trial court concluded that when read
together, the documents comprising the Family Agreement clearly provide that all the
family members agreed that "ultimate ownership and distribution upon dissolution of the
partnership would be as previously established." (R. 1164, ^[14). The trial court
concluded as a matter of law that the Family Agreement constituted a valid amendment to
both the Masazo Trust and the Partnership but they failed to explicitly modify distribution
of the replacement properties upon dissolution of the Partnership or termination of the
Trust. (R. 1164, |15). Therefore, the trial court concluded that
all assets of the Limited Partnership, including the Medical Clinic,
investment and cash accounts, water rights, and the funds invested from the
Berkshire Loan, must be distributed to the partners in accordance with their
respective capital ownership, after taking into account the effect of the
Masazo Trust distribution. (R. 1163,1(16)
In order to challenge the correctness of the trial court's legal conclusions as to the
interpretation of the contracts at issue in this case, i.e., the Family Agreement, the Masazo
Trust and the LP Agreement, Appellants must demonstrate that the trial court improperly
interpreted and applied specific language in such contractual documents from the four
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corners of the documents. On this appeal (at least as to issue no. 2)2, however, Appellants
have for the first time contended that the Family Agreement documents are ambiguous
and unclear and that resort to an examination of extrinsic facts is necessary in order to
determine the intent of the parties with respect to such documents. It is improper to raise
this issue for the first time on appeal.
Appellants have not properly preserved the legal question of whether the trial court
erred in holding that the Family Agreement is clear and unambiguous. It is well
established that courts will not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal. Wade
v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah App. 1994). Utah courts generally look at three factors
when determining whether a party properly preserved an issue for appeal: "(1) the issue
must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a
party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Brookside Mobile
Home Park, LTD. v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968, 972 (Utah 2002) as cited from Badger v.
Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Brown, 856 P.2d
358, 361 (Utah App. 1993) (for an issue to be properly preserved for appellate review, it
must be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it).

2

It appears that Appellants take an inconsistent view as to whether the Family
Agreement is ambiguous or not, depending upon the issue raised. For example, in issue no. 1,
Appellants contend that the parties entered into a "clear and unambiguous written agreement" to
sell the farm and related property (including the 30 acre parcel) and distribute the proceeds in a
specific amount to each co-tenant), but then, when making their argument as to issue no. 2,
Appellants contend that the Family Agreement is ambiguous and unclear.
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Here, counsel for Appellees has been unable to locate any instance in the trial
court record where the Appellants raised the issue of ambiguity of the Family Agreement
with respect to amending the distribution percentages of the partners upon dissolution of
the Partnership. Rather, and contrary to Appellants' current position, at the trial of this
matter Appellants argued that the court should find the Family Agreement sufficient to
modify the LP Agreement so as to provide for a distribution of the replacement
properties. (Tr. 761-68). Alternatively, Appellants argued that if the trial court did not
find the Family Agreement sufficient to modify the LP Agreement, the court should find
that the LP Agreement could be modified by conduct of the parties. {Id.) Appellants'
arguments at trial in no way raised the issue that the Family Agreement is ambiguous.
Further, the trial court never addressed the issue of ambiguity. As such, the Appellants
have failed to raise this issue and any attempt to do so now for the first time on appeal
should be barred.
Moreover, the Appellants' arguments do not track or follow their Docketing
Statement and the Statement of Issues Presented. Rather, Appellants' first issue for
appeal refers to the "clear and unambiguous written agreement", and the second issue
states that although the court found the Family Agreement to be unambiguous, the court
nonetheless erred by finding that the Family Agreement did not modify distribution of the
replacement properties upon dissolution of the Partnership. (Appellants' Brief at 3).
However, Appellants' Statement of the Issues makes no mention nor in any way refers to
Appellants' argument that the court erred by not finding the Family Agreement to be
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ambiguous. Despite the failure to present the issue of ambiguity, Appellants make
ambiguity the central focus of their argument on appeal.
As additional proof that the Appellants have not properly raised the issue of
ambiguity, Appellants cite no law with respect to proper review of a trial court's finding
that a contract is unambiguous; nor is there any discussion or analysis demonstrating that
the trial court improperly concluded that the Family Agreement failed to explicitly
modify distribution of the Partnership assets. Rather, the only discussion and citation to
law in Appellants' brief refers to how a court should view extrinsic evidence of an
ambiguous contract. The Appellants then proceed to a discussion of extrinsic evidence
without ever demonstrating or even alleging that the court erred in not finding the Family
Agreements to be ambiguous.
Importantly, there has been no legal conclusion that the Family Agreements, the
Masazo Trust or the LP Agreement are ambiguous. The trial court was never presented
with the issue of ambiguity with respect to the Family Agreement and distribution of
replacement properties. Therefore, without having challenged the trial court's legal
conclusion that the Family Agreement is not ambiguous, the Appellants cannot resort to
extrinsic evidence.
2.

As Appellants' First and Second Issues Challenge the Trial Court's
Findings and Conclusions - that the Family Agreement Failed to
Expressly Modify Distribution of the Limited Partnership - and as the
Challenge is Fact Intensive, the Appellants Have Failed in Their Duty
to Marshal the Evidence in Support.
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Utah courts hold that even where a party purports to challenge only the trial court's
legal ruling, if a determination of the correctness of the court's application of a legal
standard is fact intensive, the party has a duty to marshal the evidence. A party cannot
dodge this duty by attempting to frame the issues as legal ones. United Park City Mines
Co., v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Founds, 140 P.3d 1200, 1206 (Utah 2006); See
also Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1184-1185 (Utah 2004).
The trial court carefully analyzed the Family Agreement, and each document
comprising the same, and made numerous factual findings upon which it based its ruling
that the Family Agreement failed to modify the LP Agreement with respect to distribution
of the replacement properties. (See Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
ffif 23- 31, 37, 46, 48, 51, 56, 59 -61; R. 1174-1167). As noted above, none of these
findings referenced the presence of ambiguity in the documents. Each of these findings
were incorporated into the trial court's conclusions that the Family Agreement did not
modify the LP Agreement's provisions regarding distribution of the property of the
Partnership. Therefore, a party challenging the trial court's legal conclusions regarding
whether the Family Agreement modified the LP Agreement as to distribution must also
challenge the mixed questions of law and fact present in such conclusions. Such an
appellant has a duty to marshal the evidence to support its challenge of facts.
In order to properly marshal the evidence, a party is required to gather all the
evidence that supports the court's finding and:
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temporarily remove [their] own prejudices and fully embrace the
adversary's position; [they] mut play the devil's advocate. In so doing,
appellants must present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial
court and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their
case . . . In sum, to properly marshal the evidence the challenging party
must demonstrate how the court found the facts from the evidence and then
explain why those findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence.
United Park City Mines Co. 140 P.3d at 1207, quoting Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177,
1184-1185 (Utah 2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Here, Appellants purport to challenge the trial court's legal ruling that the Family
Agreement does not modify distribution of the replacement properties upon dissolution of
the Partnership or termination of the Masazo Trust. (Appellants' Brief at 22). However,
instead of challenging that ruling on a review of the language contained within the four
corners of the documents themselves, Appellants resort to a discussion of the parties'
subsequent actions and extrinsic evidence to support their argument. Examples of
Appellants' arguments include the following:
The second issue presented in this appeal is the interpretation of the parties'
intent in signing several documents in an effort to amend the limited
partnership agreement. (Appellants' Brief at 19) (emphasis added).
Although it is clear that the partners intended to modify their partnership
agreement, the language of the Family Agreement is ambiguous and
uncertain as to the intent of the parties regarding final distribution of the
partnership assets. {Id. at 22) (emphasis added).
There is uncertainty and ambiguity as to such terms as "pre-allocation",
"individualize" and ownership of the "separate properties" without further
explanation of how the property will be distributed or disposed of. {Id. at
23) (emphasis added).
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The precise purpose and intent of the parties regarding its impact on the
distribution of the partnership assets upon termination are not as clearly
stated. (Id.) (emphasis added).
As demonstrated by the foregoing statements, Appellants' entire argument regarding
their second issue for appeal, consists of a presentation of extrinsic evidence regarding
intent and subsequent actions. (See Appellants' Brief at 21-31). As such, the Appellants
have a duty to marshal all the evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the Family
Agreement failed to modify distribution of the replacement properties out of the
Partnership. (United Park City Mines Co. 140 P.3d at 1206). Mere recitation of selective
extrinsic facts of intent and subsequent actions in support of argument does not fulfil a
party's marshaling burden. Id. at 1207.
Here, the Appellants have failed to marshal the evidence. Appellants' Brief is
completely devoid of any recitation of all the evidence on which the trial court based its
finding, any discussion and analysis regarding viewing such evidence in a light most
favorable to Appellees, and any discussion that despite all the evidence in support, the
trial court's finding contradicts the clear weight of the evidence. (Id.). Indeed,
Appellants ignore key evidence in the record, key findings of fact made by the trial court,
and fail completely to examine the testimony and documentary exhibits admitted in
support of the trial court's findings. Rather, Appellants simply dive into a discussion of
selective extrinsic evidence of intent and subsequent actions without properly challenging
and marshaling the evidence in support of the court's finding.
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As such, this court should affirm the trial court's ruling that the Family Agreement
fails to modify the LP Agreement with respect to distribution of the Partnership assets at
dissolution.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Appellees respectfully request that this Court affirm the
trial court's ruling that (1) Tosh is entitled to one half interest in the Fidelity Account,
representing his share of the proceeds and accrued interest resulting from the sale of
Masazo's home, and (2) the Family Agreement failed to modify the LP Agreement as to
distribution of the Partnership's assets upon dissolution. Therefore the Partnership's
assets should be distributed in accordance with the terms and provisions contained
therein.
DATED this

/ '^day of October, 2007.

HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.

m A. Schmutz
Andrew V. Wright
Attorneys for Appelles
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